The recently announced discovery of potential large-scale reserves in the Brazilian so called pre-salt layer has resulted in a new legal framework for the country. In this new architecture, old and new regulation share the legal arena. Exploring this context, this paper provides an overview of the emergence and evolution of the oil and gas market in Brazil, and discusses the new legal configuration where the prevailing Concession System co-exists with the Production Sharing System and the Onerous Assignment. The conclusion pinpoints the challenges that the country faces in dealing with two energy sources -oil and gas-that will play an increasing role in Brazil's future. It also indicates that the introduction of competition also has brought new features and improvements to oil and gas industry in Brazil. Structuring a robust legal framework that will foster the necessary investments is not only a challenge for the Brazilian economy, but also one that has to be tackled by many emergent economies with newly hydrocarbon discoveries.
INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas continue to be an important source of energy all over the world. Although many investments have been made in new technologies to aid in developing new energy sources, including renewable ones, the world will still depend on oil and gas for many years (IEA, 2012) .
Several factors have caused changes in many Latin American markets, especially economic and political factors; among the most important are a rise in the international price of fossil fuels, including oil and gas, and the importance of energy security (BRAGA and CAMPOS, 2012) . In Brazil, the recently announced discovery of potential largescale reserves has trigged intense debate and resulted in a new legal framework (IBP, 2013) .
In 2012, the Brazilian Congress passed three new laws concerning Oil and Gas: (i) Law 12,276/2010 (Onerous Assignment); (ii) Law 12,304/2010 (PPSA -Pré-sal Petróleo S.A. [Pre-Salt Petroleum Co.]); and (iii) Law 12,351/2010 (Production Sharing system). In addition, the Petroleum law -Law 9,478/1997, from 1997, which regulates the Concession system-is still existing discovery of potential large-scale reserves in the Brazilian so called pre-salt layer revenue sharing scheme for Brazilian oil and gas. This paper aims to provide an overview of the emergence and evolution of the oil market in Brazil, focusing on how oil and gas regulation has been organized in the country. It also analyses the role of International Oil Companies in the Brazilian recent oil and gas history. The so-called Regulatory Mixed Regime as well as some relevant facts which were controversial during some bidding rounds will also be explained within the scope of the Concession Model, established by Law 9,478/1997. This review is based mainly on a regulatory and legal approach of the oil and gas framework released by Brazilian regulatory authority, from 1997 to 2012, and the latest version of the country's Constitution of 1988 and its amendments. This paper aims to provide an overview of the emergence and evolution of the oil market in Brazil. It also focuses on the role of International Oil Companies as well as the Brazilian oil and gas history. The so-called mixed regime will be explained, as will the importance of the Concession Model, established by Law 9,478/1997. Some relevant facts which were controversial during some Bidding Rounds will also be explained.
This paper is divided in five parts. The first part will describe the establishment of Petrobras, Brazilian National Oil Company and the legal history of oil and gas monopoly in the country, including a consideration of the relevant legal and constitutional provisions.
Part two briefly analyzes the legal framework, focusing on the Petroleum Law, which established the ANP -Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis [National Regulatory Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuel]-and instituted the Concession regime.
In sequence, the three laws that enacted the mixed regime, in 2010, will be addressed. Part three discusses the Production Sharing System and the Unitization in Brazil, both regulated by Law 12, 351/201. Legal aspects and contractual features of the Onerous Assignment, Law 12,276/2010, are treated in the fourth part of this paper. This Assignment allowed Brazilian Government to keep its position as a main shareholder in the world largest capitalization, when Petrobras raised R$120.2 billion (proximately 60.1 billion dollars) (Petrobras, 2010) .
Finally, part five discusses the current Brazilian scenario, developed under Concession Model, with some aspects of its Bidding Rounds explained in detail. Some information about production, Operators, Government Takes and the oil and gas market in Brazil will also be considered .
The paper concludes by summarizing with the challenges that the country faces in the important field of oil and gas industry.
1.PETROBRAS ESTABLISHMENT AND THE OIL MONOPOLY
Petrobras -Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. [Brazilian Petroleum Co.]-was established by the Law 2,004/1953 as the Brazilian state-controlled oil and gas company. Under this law, Petrobras was given a monopoly on oil and gas exploration and production activities (BRAZIL, 1953) .
But, as ROSADO, apud BRAGA and CAMPOS (2012) , stated, in the 1970's, Petrobras was allowed to enter into risk services contracts with private international oil companies -IOCs, showing a small market opening.
After the oil crisis in 1973, Brazilian President, Mr. Geisel, authorized Petrobras to enter into risk contracts with International Oil Companies-IOCs. At the same time, the President noted that such permission did not mean that the monopoly was no longer enforceable, nor did it mean that the monopoly no longer existed (Estado de São Paulo, 1975) .
The fact is that, prior to the Constitution of 1988, Brazil's oil and gas industry was formed not only by Petrobras, but also by other international oil companies that had begun oil exploration in Brazil. Many companies operated in Brazil during this time, including Shell, Exxon, Texaco, BP, ELF, Total, Marathon, Conoco, Hispanoil, Pecten, and Pennzoil. Some National enterprises also participated in these activities: Paulipetro, Azevedo Travassos, and Camargo Corrêa, among others (LUCCHESI, 1998) .
On the other hand, in 1972, Petrobras also established an affiliate -Petrobras Internacional S.A. (Braspetro) [Petrobras International Co.]-to act in other countries, at a time when many IOCs were moving toward global integration. During this period, Braspetro discovered oil in a huge field in Iraq (PEDROSO, JR. 2009).
Since the passage of the Constitution of 1967, the oil monopoly has had constitutional status. However, the 1967 Constitution did not mention how this monopoly should be exercised, but set forth the sole requirement that it must be done so pursuant to the law. Only in 1988 did the Constitution include more restrictive provisions. In its original version, the Constitution of 1988 had established not only the monopoly, but also the prohibition on contracting with other companies (BRAZIL, 1998) .
The Brazilian Constitution considers oil and gas, whether under production or not, property of Federal Union, even though it grants the land owner a participation in production. Article 176 of the Constitution designs the oil and gas treatment, as follows: 1 Art. 176. As jazidas, em lavra ou não, e demais recursos minerais e os potenciais de energia hidráulica constituem propriedade distinta da do solo, para efeito de exploração ou aproveitamento, e pertencem à União, garantida ao concessionário a propriedade do produto da lavra. § 1º A pesquisa e a lavra de recursos minerais e o aproveitamento dos potenciais a que se refere o "caput" deste artigo somente poderão ser efetuados mediante autorização ou concessão da União, no interesse nacional, por brasileiros ou empresa constituída sob as leis brasileiras e que tenha sua sede e administração no País, na forma da lei, que estabelecerá as condições específicas quando essas atividades se desenvolverem em faixa de fronteira ou terras indígenas. § 2º É assegurada participação ao proprietário do solo nos resultados da lavra, na forma e no valor que dispuser a lei. § 3º -A autorização de pesquisa será sempre por prazo determinado, e as autorizações e concessões previstas neste artigo não poderão ser cedidas Further, in Article 177, 1988's Constitution included the exploration of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons fluids under the Union's monopoly; prohibiting International Oil Companies to act in Brazil (BRAZIL, 1988) .
These provisions were amended to maintain the Union's monopoly over oil and gas, but, at the same time, to allow International Oil Companies to act in Brazil. According to the Constitutional Amendment 9, from 1995, the Federal Union may contract the exploration and mining of oil and natural gas and other hydrocarbon fluids (BRAZIL, 1995 The stated purpose of the Constitutional Amendment was to delegate to Congress the authority to enact laws governing the oil and gas industry (Congresso Brasileiro [Brazilian Congress], 1995).
THE PETROLEUM LAW (LAW 9,478/1997) AND THE ANP
Two years after the Constitutional Amendment, the Government published the Law 9, 478/1997 478/ (BRAZIL, 1997 , known as the Petroleum Law. This law created the ANP -Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis [National Regulatory Agency of Petroleum, ou transferidas, total ou parcialmente, sem prévia anuência do poder concedente. § 4º -Não dependerá de autorização ou concessão o aproveitamento do potencial de energia renovável de capacidade reduzida. Natural Gas and Biofuel] -and established the concession system for the research and production of Brazilian oil, gas and other fluid hydrocarbons.
As with every regulatory agency in Brazil, the ANP is an independent agency and was inspired by the United States model (BINENBOJM, 2005) .
In the U.S., "[s]ome federal agencies within the Executive Branch are called 'independent agencies' because-unlike others-their leaders cannot be fired by the President once they have been confirmed for a term of specific years." (MCALLIN, et. al, 2005) . Pursuant to the Law 9,478/1997, the ANP may have five Directors on its Board of Directors, each designated by the President, and approved by the Federal Senate. Each Director is then confirmed for a mandate of four years.
The objective of the ANP are, among others, to promote the regulation of the petroleum industry and to contract, and supervise the economic activities of the petroleum industry, pursuant to Article 8 of the Law. (ANP, 2012, c) .
These new laws and the mixed regulatory regime will be explained below. The Concession Model and some aspects of its Bidding Rounds will then be explained in detail. Some information about current production, Operators, and the oil and gas market in Brazil will also be discussed.
PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS AND THE NEW UNITIZATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Pre-salt region -a large-scale oil and gas discovery in Campos Basin-put Brazil among the top ten oil producers in the world:
Estimates of Brazilian pre-salt reserves indicate a potential for 70 to 100 billion barrels of oil equivalent -boe (sum of oil and natural gas), but the exploration process for this wealth of resources is still in its early stages. (BRAZIL, 2013, a)
According to a study prepared by Ernst (BRAZIL, 2013, b) When the discovery of the Pre-salt area was announced, it ignited many debates in the Congress and among Brazilian society (SERRA, 2013) . As is widely known, the main point of contention was whether the Sovereign Government should leave the nation's wealth in the hands of International Oil Companies or its state company, Petrobras. On the other hand, some wondered whether it would be economically and structurally feasible for Petrobras to explore and develop all fields in the area. Issues related to international policy and constitutional matters also arose.
After more than a year of debates, and many proposed laws, Law 12,351/2010 -the Production Sharing Agreement Law (PSA Law)-was enacted (BRAZIL, 2010, a) . This law introduced a new regime to the Brazilian oil and gas industry, the main features of which are described by ZACOUR at. al. (2012) The Pre-salt area is known as "a grande picanha azul," which translates to "the big blue steak," a reference to the area's similarity to a Brazilian prime cut of steak and its reputation as the premier oil and gas region in Brazil; its shape is similar to the Pre-salt polygon.
The production of oil and gas in the geographical area defined under the law will be controlled through Production Sharing Agreements. The map below shows in pink the "Pre-salt" area (BRAZIL, 2012, d) , subject to this regime.
Production Sharing Agreements, in Brazil, however, are going to be unique in one aspect: Besides the regulatory agency, ANP, and Petrobras, another state company will sign this contract: Pré-sal Petróleo S.A. -PPSA [Pre-Salt Petroleum Co.] (BRAZIL, 2010, d) .
The PPSA, accordingly SILVA (2012), will be mainly responsible for: a) conducting the management, audit, and inspecting and supervising of petroleum activities performed under PSCs; b) authorizing the bidding processes related to the exploration and production of pre-salt areas; c) representing the Government, through the operational committees, in consortiums incorporated for the execution of PSCs; and d) representing the Government in case of unitization in the presalt and strategic areas PPSA is a new player in oil and gas industry in Brazil, and to it was given a great deal of power by Law 12,304/2010 (BRAZIL, 2010 . Despite its privileged position in the operational committee, PPSA bears no risks in the exploration and production of hydrocarbon, pursuant the article 8º, §2º of Law 12,351/2010. All the risks and costs will be borne by Petrobras and the IOCs, if they are partners in the venture.
Pursuant to the PSA Law, the Pre-salt area must be developed under a Production Sharing Agreement -PSA. In addition, any other area recognized as a "strategic area" by an Executive Decree must also be developed under the PSA model (BRAZIL, 2010, a) .
This rule was strongly criticized, for many reasons. First, Brazil is known as a politically stable country for international oil and gas investments because of its legal and political consistency (ERNEST & YOUNG, 2011) . The law ignited a storm of controversial issues and created an atmosphere of uncertainty for international investors.
Some commentators have argued that the President now has too much power. They argue that although the law provides some parameters, in theory, any area in Brazil can now be declared a "strategic area" for oil and gas exploration purposes, once it has been recognized as strategic area simply as a result of a Presidential Decree.
Why is this so relevant for international investors? Because under the PSA regime, Petrobras will be the only operator of all fields, holding a minimum of 30% of participating interests (BRAZIL, 2010, a) .
Importantly, the remaining 70% of participating interests may be offered in a public bidding procedure, or they may not. In the first instance, the Union, through the Ministry of Mines and Energy, will enter into production sharing contracts directly with Petrobras. In the second instance, a public bidding procedure-through which Petrobras can improve its participating interests-will determine who will be the partner (ZACOUR, et. al, 2012) .
As a matter of fact, the Federal Union had never entered into any Production Sharing Agreements as of February 2013. In December 2012, a new law was enacted by the Congress that established royalty rates at 15%. The Brazilian PSAs have not only "profit oil," as usually set forth in this kind of contract, but also will have two additional Government Takes: bonus and royalty (BRAZIL, 2012) 3 . Once there is a determination of the royalties to be paid under the PSA model, the Agreement can be signed. It is expected that the first bidding round will occur in the second half of 2013, after the Eleventh Concession Round, although no official announcement has been made (FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, 2013) .
Local content regulation is under review by ANP. Because of the Regulatory Mixed Regime, ANP included the Onerous Assignment area within the LC regulation. Petrobras, during notes and comments period, argued the Production Sharing Regime (PSR) should also be included in the same rule, and the concept of goods should be reviewed to include expenditures not related to exploration and development to satisfy other required investments under the PSR.
Given Petrobras' request, the final proposal will likely be amended to include the PSR under the same regulation, absent some contrary action by the Government. Keeping the same rules for the PSR demonstrates that the LC rules are of great importance to the Brazilian Government because the rules may increase Petrobras' costs, thus reducing the government's profit-oil lift .
To date, ANP has not announced any Public Hearing about the contract model to be adopted by Brazil for development of oil and gas reservoirs under the Production Sharing Agreement regime (ANP, 2013, c) .
Meanwhile, some issues remain unsolved. First, the law did not address the issue if a company makes an uneconomical offer, which Petrobras do not want to be obliged with. There is no clear answer, but, in other public actions, the Government may refuse to sign a contract the it believe is unfeasible and the law that deals with public actions in Brazil is usually applied alternatively.
3 The term "Government Take" was also used in the Law 9,478/1997 and in the Law 12,351/10. In Brazil, the term has a different meaning than it generally has in the rest of the world. In this country, "Government Take" only refers to: assignment bonus, royalty, special participation and payment for the retention and occupation of the area (Law 9,478/1997, Article, 45 and Law 12,351/10, article 42), unlike other countries which consider also taxes and fees. (BRAZIL, 1997 (BRAZIL, e 2010 Moreover, is it going to be feasible for Petrobras to performance as an operator in all PSA? It will probably depends on if the company growth will be in the same pace as the improvement of exploration and production, which will be designated by the Brazilian Government. Finally, theses questions are not constitutional ones, so further legislation may address this issues and any other adaption it may be need, respecting all vested rights, which are constitutionally protected.
The new Unitization framework
Professor SMITH, et al., (2010) defines Unitization as "the cooperative exploitation of a reservoir by all interest owners so that the reservoir is developed as if it were owned and controlled by a single entity."
Law 12,351/2010 not only introduced the Production Sharing Agreement to the Brazilian Legal System, but also enacted a new legal framework for Unitization in Brazil. This Act also revoked article 27 of Law 9,478/1997, which was the sole law regulating Unitization at that moment (BRAZIL, 2010, a) .
Under the Law 9,478/1997, article 27, there had been celebrated four Unitization Agreements (in Portuguese: "Acordos de Individualização da Produção") .The first one was approved in 2007 and involved Albacora e Albacora Leste fields. In the next year, ANP approved the Agreement to Mangangá e Nautilus fields. Then, in 2009, two more Agreements were approved, the first for the fields of Camarupim and Camarupim Norte; and a second for the Campos de Lorena and Pardal fields (BRAGA and SZKLO, 2012) .
It is important to emphasize that the new Act revoked the previous provision determining that only different interest owners may be subject an Unitization. The reference to different interest owners -expressed in Law 9,478/1997-was withdrawn by the new Act. Thus, in the Brazilian legal system, it is possible that a single company may submit and receive approval for a Unitization Agreement, even if the single company is the interest owner and the operator of the two areas (BRAGA and SZKLO, 2012) .
This possibility was contemplated by the new law considering that the reservoir may underline areas under different legal regimes -consequently, under different royalties rates, taxes regimes and obligations. Analyzing the contracts, it is possible to say that even under the revoked law this issue might have arisen, given, for example, the different contractual obligations for Local Content.
Since 2010, all Unitization Agreements, under all oil and gas contracts celebrated in Brazil -including Concession Contracts, have been regulated according to Law 12,351/2010, as BRAGA and SZKLO (2012) concluded that the effects when the involved parties decline to sign the agreement are not sufficiently clear. They note that the law did not distinguish between a situation when both parties refuse to sign and a situation in which only one party refuses to sign; in this last situation, the signing party might continue to develop and produce. They also call attention to the fact that the Unification Agreement may involve only part of an area in the block under concession or PSA, and yet the termination would apply to the entire contract.
This scenario might occur if the ANP interprets the law literally. However, the article may also be constructed as authorizing the partial termination of a contract. Although this interpretation might be controversial, it seems more aligned to the public interest, given that the development and production of oil and gas is economically, socially, and politically important to the country.
On the other hand, an operator placed in jeopardy of the termination of a contract might attempt to avoid the termination by farming out that area 5 to the other common reservoir operator or relinquishing the area corresponding to the reservoir that overlaps the block, if the operator cannot reach an agreement.
THE ONEROUS ASSIGNMENT CONTRACT (LAW 12,276/10)
In conjunction with the enactment of the Production Sharing Agreement Law, Brazil enacted the Law 12,276/2010. The objective of this law was to allow Petrobras to attract new investors and to keep the Federal Union as the main shareholder, holding at least 50% of the voting shares (SOUZA, 2011) . In 2012, the Federal Union had 50,3% of the voting shares and 28,7% of the total shares. (PETROBRAS, 2012) .
The law authorized the Federal Union to sign the Onerous Assignment with Petrobras, giving the company the right to explore and to produce up to five billion barrels equivalent of crude oil. Also, under this law, the payment was made by Petrobras in federal debt securities.
At the same time, the law provides that the Federal Union might subscribe and pay Petrobras´ shares with federal debt securities. Souza notes that according to Brazilian Corporation Law, the Government could not instead pay shares with oil and gas in place, because the value of the asset could not be reviewed in that situation (SOUZA, 2011) . At the end of the day, the Brazilian Government increased its participation in Petrobras stocks through its national oil and gas proved reserves contracted with Petrobras in the Onerous Assignment.
The table below shows the areas, or reservoirs, subject to the Onerous Assignment (Área do Contrato), the volume of each area (Volume da Cessão Onerosa) and also the oil price per barrel considered (valor do barril) in the contract. Peroba area was nominated as a backup area, in case the production in other areas did not achieve the volume foreseen.
Source: SOUZA, 2011.
5 Only in the Sixth Round, the Concession Contract expressly establish rules to assign only some areas of the block under concession (ANP, 2004) . On the other hand, Fifth Round Contract, for example, establishes the power of assignment, totally or partially, although partially is not contractually defined (ANP, 2003) .
ANP contracted with Gaffney, Cline and Associates (GCA) for an audit and "valuation" of the resource (ANP, 2011,d) . The report --Review and evaluation of ten Selected discoveries and prospects In the pre-salt play of the deepwater Santos basin, Brazil -supported the contract signed by the Brazilian Government and Petrobras to development of the above-mentioned areas (BRAZIL, 2011, d) . ZACOUR, et. al, (2012) explain, in short, the main characteristics of the onerous assignment contract:
[T]he parties of this Contract, signed in September 2010, are 
The purpose of the Contract is the execution of activities of exploration and production of oil and natural gas in certain areas, as specified in the annex to the Contract. Operational risk is all of the Assignee (Petrobras).
With respect to geological risk, it is possible to say that there is no exploratory risk to the Assignee (Petrobras), considering that the Contract establishes mechanisms to ensure that Petrobras will have the right to produce the total amount of 5 billion barrels of boe. Contract (art. 1, §6, of Law 12,276/2010) . The consideration to be paid by Petrobras is composed of: (a) the price paid by the Assignee (Petrobras) to explore and produce oil and natural gas to the limit of 5 (five) billions of barrels of oil equivalent of oil, in areas of pre-salt (art. 1º, § 3, Law 12,276/2010); and (b) the royalties (art. 5 of the Law), which will be paid, monthly, in an amount corresponding to 10% (ten percent) of production of oil or natural gas . . . The property of oil extracted, up to the limit of 5 (five) billion of barrels of oil equivalent of petroleum, as well as the costs of operations, will be -in its entirety -of the Assignee (Petrobras) (art. 1º, § 1, and art. 4º of Law 12,276/2010) .
The term of the Contract is 40 (forty) years as from the date of its execution (clause 5.2). This period may be extended by the Assignor by a maximum of 5 (five) years, upon request of Assignee (Petrobras) (clause 5.3). . . .

Petrobras cannot transfer any of its rights under the Onerous Assignment
Finally, the control of the operations to be performed by Petrobras will be up to the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels -ANP (art. 7 of Law 12,276/2010) .
As prescribed in Article 5, Special Participation (explained below) is not required for the production of this amount of oil. The State of Rio de Janeiro -the main beneficiary of this Government Take-argued the unconstitutionality (STF, 2012, a) of this article in the Supreme Court in November 2011. As of February 2013, no in limine or final decision had been reached.
The Concession Regime and the exploration and production in Brazil
When the Petroleum Law was enacted, Petrobras had already been operating and producing in Brazil. As a transition, the law allowed Petrobras to carry on the operations in areas where it had already been working. The law also determined that Petrobras should sign Concession Contracts in each of these areas. These contracts came to be known as "Round Zero" (ANP, 2011, b, f) . As determined in Article 33 of Law 9,478/1997, 397 contracts were signed with Petrobras in 1998.
Since then, ANP has promoted ten annual Bidding Round of Blocks for Exploration and Production of Oil & Natural Gas. This is a mandatory procedure, accordingly the Law 9,478/1997, Article 23:
Art. 23. Oil and gas exploration, development and production activities shall be exercised by means of concession agreements preceded by public bids, as set forth herein, or by the production sharing model in the pre-salt and strategic areas, as per the specific laws thereto.
Prior to August 2012, there were seventy seven different economic groups performing exploration and production activities in
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Brazil, including International Oil Companies and Brazilian independent producers. Among them, thirty eight are foreign (ANP, 2012, f) .
A summary of each Round can be found on the ANP website (ANP, 2013, h It is important to note that the Eighth Round was suspended, under judicial order (ANP, 2013, f (ANP, 2012, b) Unfortunately, the last Round had taken place in 2008, shortly before the debates about the Pre-salt area began. At that time, the Tenth Round only " [o] ffer [ed] 130 blocks, all located in onshore basins, this Bidding Round has attained its goal of attracting small and mediumsized companies, alongside with major oil companies." (ANP, 2013, e) After a hiatus of almost four years, the Federal Government announced the next Bidding Round of Blocks for Exploration and Production of Oil & Natural Gas:
President Dilma Rousseff authorized today (9/18/2012) (ANP, 2012, e) In December, 18, 2012, The National Council for Energy Policy authorized ANP, on 01/11/2013, to hold the Eleventh Bidding Round (ANP, 2013, g ), which will offer blocks in seventeen sectors, totaling 121.2 thousand km² in basins of new borders and mature basins. The area being offered covers nine sedimentary basins and forms 172 blocks, on shore and offshore (ANP, 2013, b) .
The exploratory blocks on shore are: Espírito Santo Basin, Parnaíba Basin, Potiguar Basin, Recôncavo Basin, Sergipe-Alagoas Basin. The Offshore Sectors, located on shallow waters, are: Barreirinhas Basin, Foz do Amazonas Basin. These areas can be seen on Appendix I (ANP, 2013, d) .
The Eleventh Bidding Round will be governed by Resolution nº 27/2012, which approves the Regulations dealing with procedures for bidding on the acquisition of blocks intended for the hiring of exploration and production activities of oil and natural gas under the concession regime. An unofficial version in English can be found at ANP website (ANP, 2013, a) . Also, information about areas offered in the Eleventh Round, qualification to participate, and data package area available in English (ANP, 2013, c).
Production and Government Takes under Concession Regime
According to Petroleum Law, the companies that operate in Brazil must be established under Brazilian law. "Foreign companies are allowed to participate in Brazil Round []. In the event of success, the winner company must provide performance guarantees to a Brazilian affiliate who will sign the Concession Agreement." (ANP, 2007) .
Many international companies have both a Brazilian affiliate and a successful business in Brazil, although Petrobras is still responsible for more than 90% of all oil and gas produced in Brazil (ANP, 2012, a) .
Besides Petrobras, the main producers in Brazil and their countries of origin are: (1) Statoil Brasil (Norway); (2) Shell Brasil (Anglo-Dutch); (3) BG Brasil (United Kingdom); (4) Sinochem Petróleo (China); (5) Manati (Brazil); (6) Petrogal Brasil (Portugal); (7) OGX (Brazil); (8) BP Energy (United Kingdom); (9) Repsol (Spain); (10) ONGC Campos (India) (ANP, 2012, a) . It is important to remember that, according to Brazilian law, all these companies are Brazilian (BRAZIL 1997), although they are affiliated of foreign companies.
The table below shows the most productive fields in Brazil, including the Statoil and Shell fields (ANP, 2012, a) . Actually, Chevron, operating the Frade field, was usually figured as one of these major producers before its first oil spill, which occurred on November, 2011 (Chevron, 2012 . In January, 2011, Frade was the Ninth Field in total production (ANP, 2011, c).
Source: ANP, 2011, c.
Oil & Gas Industry in Brazil -Laís Palazzo Almada and Virgínia Parente
Among these fields, only Leste Urucu, Rio Urucu and Carmópolis are onshore. The Brazilian oil and gas industry is remarkable for its offshore production. Roughly, 90% of oil production is offshore and about 75% of gas production is offshore. This difference can be attributed to Urucu Field (Leste Urucu, Rio Urucu and Sudoeste do Urucu), a major non-associated gas productor, located in Solimões Basin, Amazonas (ANP, 2012, a) .
The average of API Gravity from Brazilian oil-defined for The American Petroleum Institute-is about 24º. The production is represented for: 9% of light oil (>= 31º API), 57% of medium oil(>=22°API e <31°API) e 34% of heavy oil, (<22°API), accordingly to the ANP's classification (ANP, 2012, a) .
Under the Concession System, the Operator acquires the ownership of the hydrocarbons once produced. At the same time, there emerges a duty to pay royalties.
Royalties, under the Concession regime, are ten percent, but can be reduced to as little as five percent. In deciding to reduce royalties, ANP will consider the geological risks, the production expectations, and other relevant factors. The majority of the fields pay royalties of ten percent (SERRA, 2013) .
Royalties are due on the last workday of the month subsequent to the production. In the Concession system, royalties are not paid in kind. To determine the price of the oil, ANP considers physio-chemical composition, TBP (True Boiling Point) curve, API gravity and sulfur content. This data is compared to Brent Oil and other crude oil benchmarks (ANP, 2009 ).
The graph below shows the amount of royalties paid, per year, since ANP was established.
Before ANP was established, royalties were five percent of the production. These royalties were calculated and paid directly by Petrobras for the beneficiaries, according to Law 2,004/1953 and Law 7.990/1989 (BRAZIL, 1953 e 1989 .
Another important Government Take paid in Brazil is the "Participação Especial -PE" [Special Participation]. Although only fields with great production volumes pay Special Participation, this Government Take collects more money than does Royalty. Below, it is possible to verify the amount of Special Participation and compare it with Royalties payments above.
Source: Authors.
In 2009, sixteen fields paid Special Participation; this number increased to nineteen in 2012. Without exception, like every other field in Brazil, theses fields also pay royalties.
In contrast to royalties-that is, a fixed percentage of productionthe calculation of Special Participation is complex. The tax basis considers not only the profits, but also some of the costs, which can be deduced according to some of ANP's rules (Portaria ANP 10/99 and Portaria ANP 58/2001).
On the other hand, rates are fixed in the Decree 2,705/1998 and will vary, depending on: (1) production volume; (2) field location: onshore, offshore and offshore deeper than 400 meters (about 1,300 feet) under the sea; and (3) years of production, which stabilizes in the fourth year.
This decree provides twelve tables, with all the possible rates. The table below presents some examples of applicable rates to fields with more than four years of production. Each line in the graphic represents the three possible locations, and the rates increase as production increases. in appreciating the veto (STF, 2013) . As of February, 2013, there is no final decision. In the second one, no opinion was delivered.
CONCLUSION
The oil and gas industry in Brazil has changed a great deal since the Constitutional Amendment of 1995. Although Petrobras is still the major player in this market, the mere fact that competition, introduced by the Concession Regime, has brought some new features and improvements to oil and gas industry in Brazil, resulting in significant volumes of production.
At the same time, Brazil has gained the status of being considered a stable country for International Oil Companies. Fortunately, some misleading events involving the Eighth Round and the Ninth Round, which were suspended, have been overcame, putting an end in any inconsistency that may have arose.
Additionally, the Eleventh Round recovers the attention to Brazilian oil and gas industry and has been appointed as a way to recover new investments and create opportunities in the country. It is expected that the first Production Sharing Agreement auction will occur still in 2013, although there is no official announcement yet. Notwithstanding, IOCs have great expectations about the model of Production Sharing Agreement to be adopted by Brazil.
In the meantime, oil and gas revenue sharing remains to be decided. From the investors' point of view, there should not be any concern. The amounts to be paid, under Concession Regime and under PSA, are already defined and not under debate in Congress. However, this is of great concern to the Government.
The Brazilian Government will also have to gauge the international reaction to the new regime after it goes into effect. Pré-sal Petróleo S.A.-PPSA remains unfamiliar even to Brazilian investors. On the other hand, the state owned company, Petrobras, is a consolidated and respected company worldwide, even when facing the ups and downs due to the domestic economic policy, holding back fuel prices to compromise with inflation target. Moreover, Brazilian Government has always shown consistency in oil and gas agreements and had never breached any contract, fostering a safe environment for long run investments.
The lessons learned from this experience show that structuring a robust legal framework to foster the necessary investments is not only a challenge for the Brazilian economy, but also one that has to be tackled by many emergent economies with newly hydrocarbon discoveries.
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